We assess whether a cardinal model can be used to relate neural observables to stochastic choice behavior. We develop a general empirical framework for relating any neural observable to choice prediction and propose a means of benchmarking their predictive power. In a previous study, measurements of neural activity were made while subjects considered consumer goods. Here, we find that neural activity predicts choice behavior with the degree of stochasticity in choice related to the cardinality of the measurement. However, we also find that current methods have a significant degree of measurement error which severely limits their inferential and predictive performance.
Traditional economic methods for establishing a utility representation, such as revealed preference, are now routinely used to identify the anatomical and functional characteristics of "value" signals in the human brain (Fehr & Rangel, 2011; Glimcher & Fehr, 2013) . This suggests a general strategy for eliciting preferences in situations when revealed preference methods are problematic or choice data are unavailable: measurements of neural activity can be used to assess valuations of choice alternatives to directly predict a subject's choice behavior (Knutson, Rick, Wimmer, Prelec, & Loewenstein, 2007; Krajbich, Camerer, Ledyard, & Rangel, 2009; Lebreton, Jorge, Michel, Thirion, & Pessiglione, 2009; Levy, Lazzaro, Rutledge, & Glimcher, 2011; Smith, Bernheim, Camerer, & Rangel, 2014; Telpaz, Webb, & Levy, 2015; Tusche, Bode, & Haynes, 2010) . Indeed, such prediction methods have not only been applied within individuals but also across individuals and across populations (Falk, Berkman, & Lieberman, 2012; Genevsky & Knutson, 2015; Genevsky, Yoon, & Knutson, 2017; Smith et al., 2014; Telpaz et al., 2015) .
The early prediction literature has proceeded along two avenues. The first established the ordinal properties of the neural measurement within a deterministic choice model Tusche et al., 2010) . In effect, it was assumed that the choice alternative associated with the higher measurement of neural activity is always chosen. The second relaxed this assumption of ordinality in an effort to better fit the choice data. It is well accepted that choice behavior exhibits stochastic properties (Luce, 1959) , and cardinal methods allow the proba-bility of choosing an item to depend on the difference in measured neural activity between two choice alternatives (Knutson et al., 2007; Smith et al., 2014 , see "Related Literature" for a full review).
However, in the context of choice prediction, little attention has been paid to the sources of stochasticity-in neural activity and its measurement-which lead to a cardinal choice model. Of course, it is widely held in neuroscience that neural activity is inherently stochastic, and the cardinal properties of neural measurements have been routinely described for over half a century (Glimcher, 2005; Rieke, Warlan, van Steveninck, & Bialek, 1997) . However, the sources of this stochasticity, and at what stage of the choice process it might arise, can have critical implications for how researchers relate stochastic neural data to stochastic choice behavior. In particular, our understanding of how the statistical properties of neural measurements interact with the experimental paradigm is limited, thus impacting both choice prediction and inference.
In economics, the class of random utility models is routinely applied to capture stochastic choice behavior within a utility maximization framework (Becker, DeGroot, & Marschak, 1963; McFadden, 1973 McFadden, , 1981 McFadden, , 2001 ). Many of these models have the inherently cardinal feature that the probability of choosing an alternative is related to the differences in utilities. Motivated by classic experiments which demonstrate that choice probabilities vary with utility (Hey & Orme, 1994; Mosteller & Nogee, 1951) , random utility models (RUMs) have been widely applied to experimental data. However, some studies have also questioned the relevance of a cardinal model for individual stochastic choice behavior, at least in some cases, instead proposing that utilities might be random but not cardinal (e.g., "random preference" models, Loomes, 2005) . For instance, Agranov and Ortoleva (2017) presented subjects with repeated choice sets over lotteries, and consistent with previous literature, they found that a large majority of subjects exhibit stochastic choice. However, they also found no statistically significant relationship between the difference in the (estimated) expected utility of any two lotteries and the likelihood that a subject switched their choice on repeated trials. How best to model stochastic choice behavior is still a question of much debate (Hey, 2005) .
In this article, we aim to assess whether a cardinal framework can, and should, be used to relate neural observables to stochastic choice behavior. Below, we outline a broadly applicable econometric framework for relating neural observables to stochastic choice behavior, which we call the neural random utility model (NRUM). The NRUM extends familiar aspects of the random utility framework to neural observables, including both the maximization of stochastic decision variables and the possibility that differences in these variables contain information for choice prediction.
In addition, the NRUM allows the development of hypotheses about the various sources of error present in the measurement of neural activity, an issue that has not been addressed by previous literature. We demonstrate how these errors interact with stochastic decision variables in a choice prediction exercise, and we examine how features of the experimental design allow separate estimation of measurement error from the stochastic decision variable. This allows us to quantify the relative magnitudes of these errors in a way that is not possible with an ordinal approach, providing an estimate of the variance of measurement error in choice prediction experiments.
Because the model is general purpose, it can be used with regard to any neural observable to assess whether different experiments-or future measurement techniques-provide true advances in choice prediction. To demonstrate this feature, we apply it to a well-known data set previously used to establish the ordinal properties of a neural measurement . In the first stage of the experiment, subjects were shown each of 20 consumer items while they were inside a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) scanner. For each item, targeted measurements of neural activity in the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and the striatum were recorded. In the second stage, subjects were asked to make choices between all pairs of the items, with all choice sets repeated twice. This data set thus has a crucial feature that can be used to test a cardinal choice model. As the measurements were made independently of the choice (over the course of an hour), the scale on which the measurements were made must be (at least partially) maintained over measurements This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
for the data set to have any predictive power. This would provide evidence for one property of a cardinal measurement, namely that each measurement is from a common scale.
The data also hint at a second property of a cardinal measurement, namely that differences between measurements contain predictive information. Although the choice behavior of subjects was relatively consistent, maintaining transitivity in 96% of eligible triplets, subjects did switch their choices in 9.3% of the repeated choice sets they faced. This is a degree of choice stochasticity typically found in such experiments (Telpaz et al., 2015) . Even though the analysis in consisted of an ordinal ranking of the bloodoxygenation-level-dependent (BOLD) activity for each item (see Figure 1 )-the item with the higher ranking was always predicted to be chosen-the choice prediction rate was highest for the pairs of items with the largest ordinal "distance" in ranking (83% vs. an overall prediction rate of 56%, across all choice sets and all subjects). This suggests that the distance between neural measurements matters. However, the analysis in this widely cited study highlights two issues typical of the neuroscientific literature on choice:
• The sources of stochasticity in neural prediction variables are not modeled at all. Note that the prediction exercise appears to perform worse than chance for items with adjacent rankings-which is obviously impossible. This arises because neural measures are constructed via multiple levels of analyses. The interaction between these random variables, the errors in their measurement, and the choice prediction exercise can, and has, led to errors in inference.
1
• An ordinal analysis does not account for some information, namely, the difference in neural activity, that may improve predictive performance for repeated choice sets. For instance, whereas an ordinal model does not predict that a subject will switch their preference, a cardinal analysis can vary the probability of choice according to the difference in neural activity. These issues can be addressed by applying the NRUM to this data set. We find that the difference in the neural observable is significantly correlated with choice behavior-and has choice prediction power beyond chance; however, we also find evidence for a startling degree of measurement error in the neural data. This measurement error biases model estimates toward zero, adversely affecting both prediction rates and inference about which brain areas have predictive power. It also leads to seemingly puzzling features of the choice data. The NRUM allows a partial correction for measurement error, and we examine features of the experimental design which yield identification of the source of error. Once the measurement error is accounted for, the data are consistent with the NRUM.
Finally, a means of benchmarking the predictive power of the measurements, with regard to stochastic choice, is also proposed. Existing prediction methods treat each choice trial independently, even if there are repeated trials from the same set. We propose two methods for assessing the predictive performance of such repeatedchoice paradigms and demonstrate that the ordinal prediction methods used to date cannot capture these basic features of the data. We also find that the neural measurements found in the analysis by yield in-sample choice prediction results barely on par with standard observables (price and quality ratings), even after accounting for their cardinal features. Combining the neural measurements with these standard economic observables improves predictive performance. Although this suggests that these two types of observables contain orthogonal predictive information, it remains to be seen if improvements in measurement technology can achieve improved prediction rates.
Related Literature Choice Prediction With Neural Observables
Much of the initial excitement in the field of neuroeconomics involved extracting value signals from the vast amount of data produced by fMRI studies. Typically, these studies measured 1 Each neural measurement is constructed from numerous independent scans, each comprising a large amount of data with a spatial and temporal structure, and each measurement is related to repeated choices from one of ͩ 20 2 ͪ binary choice sets. The sources of stochasticity present in neural measurement, the experimental paradigm, and how they interact in choice prediction are clearly important aspects of any econometric evaluation of such data sets (Harrison, 2008) . the response in neural activity to some behavioral manipulation or stimulus, such as willingness-to-pay or reward amount, and analyzed models of the form:
Here, neural activity is the dependent variable and ␤ is the parameter of interest, in particular, which brain regions significantly code value signals. Recent meta-analyses of this literature (now amounting to over 200 independent data sets) identify that activity in two brain areas, the ventral striatum and the mPFC, is tightly correlated with every known economic method for estimating the values subjects place on choice objects-ranging from consumable goods, to money lotteries, to charitable donations, to durable goods, to social preferences, to political preferences (Bartra, McGuire, & Kable, 2013; Clithero & Rangel, 2013; Levy & Glimcher, 2012) .
Building on these advances, neuroeconomists began exploring whether this relationship could be reversed for the purpose of explaining choice behavior.
Pr͑Behavior͒ ϭ ␤NeuralActivity ϩ ⑀. (2)
In this modeling approach, neural activity (causally) determines the choice probability, and the strength of this relationship is governed by the parameter ␤. For example, in a landmark study, Knutson et al. (2007) applied a logit model to an fMRI data set and found that incentivized purchasing behavior can be predicted by measures of neural activity in the mPFC and the ventral striatum. Follow-up studies have demonstrated similar results in binary choice experiments over disparate objects (FitzGerald, Seymour, & Dolan, 2009 ) and have even extended this analysis to market-level outcomes (Falk et al., 2012; Genevsky et al., 2017; Genevsky & Knutson, 2015; Venkatraman et al., 2015) . 2 An obvious concern with equation (2) is that there are a large number of potential neural variables in an fMRI data set to use as predictors, much larger than the number of choice observations. This suggests that many neural signals will be correlated with choice by chance. The initial literature took a conservative approach to this issue by defining regions of interest either a priori or via independent localization. 3 In an effort to improve prediction rates, more sophisticated methods for model selection have been developed. For example, Smith et al. Figure 1 . Choice prediction results (across subjects) from ordinal analysis of medial prefrontal cortex activity ). Blood-oxygenation-level-dependent (BOLD) activity for each item was ranked (within subject). Choice sets with an ordinal distance of 19 consist of the two items with the highest and lowest BOLD measurement, whereas choice sets with an ordinal distance of 1 consist of items that are adjacent in the ranking.
(2014) used a shrinkage estimator to determine which voxels to include as predictors. 4 Regardless of the estimation method, analysis based on the model (2) is inherently cardinal. The parameter(s) ␤ determine how choice probabilities change in response to neural activity, and these probabilities can then be used to predict choices out-of-sample. For instance, in the study by Smith et al. (2014) , the fitted probabilities P from the regression (2) are used to code a predicted choice and then compared with the choices from a holdout sample, yielding a neurochoice prediction rate of 61% withinsubject. 5 The estimates of ␤ therefore determine the relative weights of different brain areas, voxels, or stimuli in determining choice. We will use this cardinal framework to consider the stochastic structure that underlies both behavior and neural activity.
Measurement error in choice prediction. One useful example of why it is important to address the stochastic structure of a choice model is the prevalence of measurement error in fMRI data sets. Because neural activity is not typically observed directly, only an indirect measure of it is available for prediction (say via the BOLD measure from fMRI). To model measurement error, we follow the standard approach of appending a measurement error, , to our variable of interest. In standard analyses based on equation (1), measurement error is somewhat innocuous: any error in the measurement of neural data will simply end up in the error term of the regression,
Though clearly adds noise to the model, thereby increasing standard errors, the estimate of ␤ is not directly affected. A number of methods have been proposed to address this issue in standard fMRI analysis software, primarily relying on the autocorrelation structure of the measurement error (Lund, Madsen, Sidaros, Luo, & Nichols, 2006) .
In the choice prediction model (2), however, the impact of measurement error is more nefarious. Now the measurement error is embedded in the explanatory variables of the model. We can observe this by directly substituting in equation (3).
Pr͑Behavior͒ ϭ ␤NeuralActivity ϩ ⑀ ϭ ␤NeuralMeasure ϩ (Ϫ␤ ϩ ⑀)
Because the error term⑀ (which includes the measurement error) is now correlated with the explanatory variable (via equation [3] ), a critical exogeneity assumption of the regression model is violated. This "error-in-variables" problem biases the estimate of ␤ toward zero (Yatchew & Griliches, 1985) .
7 Not only does this bias alter the predicted choice probability given a change in the neural measure, but it also means that inference on ␤ for a given brain region or voxel will be too conservative. On average, this will lead to fewer rejections of a false null hypothesis (i.e., increased "Type II Errors"). In the section "Testing an NRUM With Behavioral and Neural Measurements," we will demonstrate how the NRUM can be used to address the measurement error problem.
Models of Stochastic Choice
The literature on modeling stochastic choice consists primarily of two model classes that fall 4 A logit model comprising all voxels is evaluated, but the model's likelihood is penalized via a LASSO regression to guard against overfitting. This penalization acts as a model selection criterion, with the resulting estimates of ␤ 0 only for some voxels.
5 Machine-learning algorithms can also be used to jointly analyze (or weight) regions of activity within the mPFC to classify whether a particular item was chosen, or not, from a binary choice set (Kahnt, 2017 , for a review). These weights can then be applied to a test data set to predict choice behavior. Krajbich et al. (2009) used such methods to classify valuations in a public goods game with 60% accuracy, whereas Tusche et al. (2010) observed classification rates upward of 75% in a choice task over activities. However, this binary classification does not provide relative choice probabilities, only predicted outcomes. The former plays a crucial role in modeling stochastic choice behavior.
6 See Greene (2003) for a textbook treatment of measurement error.
7 Also see Ramsey et al. (2010) for a discussion of this issue in dynamic causal modeling.
under the technical definition of a RUM (Becker et al., 1963) . Consider a set of n items, indexed i ϭ 1, . . . , n. Denote P i the probability that alternative i is chosen from this set, or equivalently, the frequency with which i is chosen on repeated trials. A RUM posits the existence of a vector of random variables u, with element u i , such that
Conditions placed on P i determine whether observed behavior is consistent with the principle of utility maximization (Block & Marschak, 1959; Falmagne, 1978; McFadden, 2005) .
The two approaches to modeling stochastic choice, although both technically RUMs, are distinct in interpretation. One class, known as random preference models, posits that a choice is represented by a preference relation (or utilities u) stochastically drawn from a set U which obeys some underlying axioms (Gul & Pesendorfer, 2006; Loomes & Sugden, 1995) . Each alternative in a choice set is processed simultaneously according to this realized preference relation. This approach allows for preferences to vary from trial to trial for different realizations of u, but in a manner that is internally consistent with the axioms that determine membership in U. Such models have important implications for both model testing and normative analysis, as they posit no violations of the underlying axioms owing to stochasticity (Loomes, 2005) .
A second approach to modeling choice stochasticity derives from the vast literature on stochasticity in sensory perception (Fechner, 1860; McFadden, 2001 ).
8 A Fechnerian RUM holds that choices can be described by a single "core" valuation v i that is perceived or represented with error ⑀ i for each item, such that u i ϭ v i ϩ ⑀ i . The perturbed value is then compared, and the number of choice errors (in violation of the ordering given by v i ) is governed by the magnitude of the difference v i Ϫ v j , @j i. Therefore, the additive model is described as cardinal (Batley, 2008) .
9 Empirical studies that use the Fechnerian model include Buschena and Zilberman (2000) , Hey and Orme (1994) , Hey (1995), and Hey (2005) , with the negative result found in Agranov and Ortoleva (2017) previously noted. Review articles that contrast the behavioral evidence for the two approaches can be found in Loomes (2005) and Wilcox (2008) . 10 Intriguingly, support for both random preference and Fechnerian approaches can be found in the neuroscience evidence (in so far as neural evidence can be used to support an economic model). It is widely held that the activity of a neuron is governed by a fundamentally stochastic (thermodynamic) process, and this stochasticity extends to the populations of neurons that act as basic computational units (Glimcher, 2005) .
11 It has also been demonstrated empirically that the instantaneous perception of the attributes of a stimulus is stochastic even when all properties of the stimulus and state of the chooser are held constant (Stevens, 1961) . This stochasticity in subjective perception has been shown to be an obligate feature at all levels of sensory processing (see Glimcher, 2011 , for an overview; Beck, Ma, Pitkow, Latham, & Pouget, 2012; Woodford, 2014 , for relation to optimality), and this would necessarily lead to stochasticity in preferences. 12 However, the stochasticity of neural activity extends beyond sensory processing, particularly to the neural circuitry necessary for comparison and implementation of motor actions. A class of models of this process, referred to as bounded 8 See also Falmagne (1985) , Stevens (1961) , and Weber (1834). For applications in the economics literature, see Camerer and Ho (1994) , Harrison and Rutstrom (2008) , Hey and Orme (1994) , Johnson and Ratcliff (2013) , and Loomes (2005) for reviews.
9 A taxonomical issue currently exists between the theoretical and applied discrete choice literature in economics. The applied literature classifies the additive model as an RUM because it satisfies the definition (7). However, the theoretical literature does not because the stochasticity in the model leads to violations of the axioms underlying membership in U. Here, we return to the standard definition from Becker et al. (1963) used by the applied literature.
10 See also Apesteguia and Ballester (2018) for critical issues with estimation.
11 Neural activity shows significant variation even under conditions in which measurement error can be shown to be near zero (Churchland et al., 2010 (Churchland et al., , 2011 Tolhurst, Movshon, & Dean, 1983) . It is widely held that this is not simply a high-dimensional signal of zero stochasticity projected imperfectly into a low-dimensional space via limitations in measurement. For more on this issue, see Rieke et al. (1997) and Shadlen and Newsome (1998). accumulation models (BAMs), posits the dynamic accumulation of a decision signal to a threshold given a value input. 13 In the wellknown drift diffusion model (Fehr & Rangel, 2011; Ratcliff, 1978) , the relative values of the alternatives determine the slope of the accumulation, which determines the choice probabilities. A tight relationship exists between these BAMs and the stochastic choice literature; the choice probabilities of a BAM can be represented by a Fechnerian RUM, therefore imply a cardinal random utility representation (Webb, 2018) .
14 The mixture of behavioral and neural evidence for both a random preference and a Fechnerian RUM approach suggests that the least restrictive econometric specification should be composed of a stochastic valuation (which may be restricted by a particular theory) and a subsequent error term that is, in essence, cardinal and strictly welfare decreasing. We stress that it may, in some cases, be necessary to restrict the econometric problem to a model with only one (or a linear combination) of these sources of stochastic choice for the purpose of identification, depending on the nature of the data being analyzed. Indeed this will be the case for our current data set. However, we present here the more general case as a starting point for theory and note explicitly our identification assumptions.
Neural Random Utility Model
We now adapt the standard framework for stochastic choice in economics, random utility maximization, to a form that explicitly treats subjective value as a stochastic neural observable. We present the model for a binary choice set {i, j}, and we observe repetitions of all binary sets from the same subject. The extension of the model beyond binary choice is straightforward, though we note special considerations.
The subjective value of item i on trial t is defined to be an observable random variable v i,t ʦ ‫ޒ‬ ϩ , with the vector of subjective values denoted as v t ʦ ‫ޒ‬ ϩ n . In principle, v t is observable in the firing rate activity of value-related neurons. 15 We assume v t is independent over trials but not necessarily over items. Although we do not yet formally specify a distribution for v t , let us define i,t as the difference between v i,t and its mean E [v i,t ], for each item,
We emphasize that v i,t is the only observable in equation (8), and we provide a distributional assumption shortly. 16 Note that the distribution of v i,t puts no restrictions on the covariances over items, allowing a random preference formulation. 17 We discuss this issue further in the section "Normative Implications: Distribution of Subjective Value."
Once subjective values are instantiated in neural activity, they must be compared and a choice executed. This additional neural process, which we refer to as the "choice mechanism," effectively compares subjective values in the requisite circuitry for producing behavior. The neural evidence suggests this comparison takes place via an accumulation of v i,t to threshold in dorsomedial and parietal regions of the cortex (Basten, Biele, Heekeren, & Fiebach, 2010; Domenech, Redouté, Koechlin, & Dreher, 2018; Hare, Schultz, Camerer, O'Doherty, & Rangel, 13 Neural evidence for such dynamics in neural activity has been uncovered both in psychophysical and economic choice tasks (Basten et al., 2010; Gold & Shadlen, 2007; Hare et al., 2011) , as well as behavioral evidence for the role of decision dynamics and attention (Krajbich, Armel, & Rangel, 2010; Milosavljevic, Malmaud, Huth, Koch, & Rangel, 2010) .
14 This also clarifies the relationship between BAMs and the NRUM. Accumulation models place restrictions on the form of the NRUM and will prove invaluable for exploring a more structural approach to modeling decisions. However, we do note that the NRUM brings a large econometric toolbox to bear for relating neural observables to choice prediction and for testing the predictions of more structural approaches with weaker assumptions on functional forms. 15 Electrophysiological evidence for such observables can be found in Padoa-Schioppa (2013) and Rich and Wallis (2016) . 16 One possible interpretation of E [v i,t ] is a "core" value, instantiated noiselessly by some biological mechanism, but represented with error in the neural substrate under observation. This is not a view compatible with the biophysical properties of neural processes. Instead, we interpret E [v i,t ] as simply the limiting quantity of the sample mean of v i,t and our definition of i,t in an additive specification is for the purpose of exposition.
17 However, we do restrict the variance to be constant over items. In addition, there is the question of whether the central tendency of subjective value is stable or if it can be manipulated through contextual effects; for the purposes of this experiment, we assume a stable mean over trials. 2011). Webb (2018) demonstrated that this process is equivalent to a random utility formulation with an additive noise term i,t ʦ t ʦ ‫ޒ‬ ϩ n that captures stochasticity in this maximization operation. This yields the decision vector
For a binary choice trial t, the subject chooses i from the pair of items {i, j} t if
yielding a probability of choosing i on trial t
where ⌬v ij,t ϵ v i,t Ϫ v j,t . The notation ⌬• ij denotes the ijth item-pair difference throughout. Because the differences in measurements of subjective value determine these probabilities, this model now exhibits properties of cardinality (Batley, 2008, p. 47) . Equation (10) is the conditional probability of choosing i given a measurement of subjective value during a choice. Before we arrive at a specification suitable for our empirical application, we must take two additional steps. First, we will need to impose some distributional structure on t ; therefore, we assume that the difference in additive noise is independent over item-pair and trial and distributed normally,
This yields a probability of choosing i (11) where ⌽() is the standard normal cumulative distribution function.
Second, our experimental application attempts to relate subjective value measures in the absence of choice to subsequent choice behavior. By design, we do not observe the realization of subjective value v i,t on the trial t in which the choice was made; therefore, specification (11) is inappropriate for analysis. Though an observation of v i,t in synchrony with the choice of our subjects would yield both the best predictive results and sharpest inference, the choice probability can also be derived conditional on the mean of subjective value E[v i,t ] and not just its realization on a choice trial.
To demonstrate this, let us assume the fluctuations in subjective value around its mean, , are distributed, N͑0, ⍀ ͒ with covariance matrix ⍀ . As our experiment uses a binary choice environment, the realizations of ⌬ ij,t for different item-pairs must occur on different trials t. Therefore, the ⌬ ij,t are independent over ij owing to independence over trials, even for different item-pairs that share an item.
19 Therefore, ⌬ ij,t is distributed N͑0, ⌬ 2 ͒, and this yields a probability of choosing i,
where ⌬ϩ⌬ is the standard deviation of the sum of the two neural noise terms ⌬ t and ⌬ t . This term reflects the degree of stochasticity in choice owing to stochasticity in neural activity. Clearly, predictive accuracy is worse under this specification because ⌬ϩ⌬ Ͼ ⌬ . However, E[ i,t ] is not an observable; therefore, equations (12) and (13) should be viewed as the limiting probabilities given a sample mean that approaches E [v i,t ]. The sample analog, derived from repeated measurements of v i,t , is 18 There is little known about the appropriate distribution of t at this level of aggregation, though Webb (2018) provided a derivation directly from BAMs. The assumption of independence over item-pair is only made for convenience, see footnote 19. 19 The extension of the model beyond binary choice would have to account for a full covariance matrix for the vector composed of the ⌬ ij,t on each trial (similarly for the ⌬ ij,t ). In principle, a full covariance matrix should be identifiable for such a data set (Hausman & Wise, 1978; Train, 2009 ) and the results that follow would have to be argued in terms of this full matrix. The assumption of normality for v t is again made for convenience. To our knowledge, no study has yet examined the distribution of the aggregate firing rates that make up subjective value.
where ⌬ϩ⌬ ¡ ⌬ϩ⌬ as ⌬ ij ¡ 0. This is the specification we will work from in our empirical setting.
Testing an NRUM With Behavioral and Neural Measurements
We now establish the NRUM as an econometric toolset for relating neural observables to choice prediction in an experimental data set. In the section "A Cardinal Neural Observable," we apply the model to a combined data set of choices and neural measurements from two brain regions known to encode subjective value (mPFC and striatum) and one control region in the occipital cortex (OCC). A detailed description of the experiment, including the BOLD measure of neural activity, can be found in the Appendix section "The Experiment." The role measurement error plays in the relationship between the BOLD measure and choice behavior is examined in the section "Accounting for Measurement Error."
In the analysis, we treat the item-pair and the two choices made in each pair as the dimensions of our behavioral data set and pool item-pairs over subjects. For 12 subjects, this yields n ϭ 4,560 choices grouped into 2,280 pairs.
20 Essentially we are treating different subjects viewing the same item-pairs as equivalent to the same subject viewing different item-pairs. Although this allows each subject's preferencestherefore subjective valuations-to be idiosyncratic, it does contain the implicit assumption that the relationship between subjective valuation, the BOLD measure, and the choice likelihood is the same across subjects. We relax this assumption in the section "Subject-Specific Analysis" at the expense of a reduced sample size.
A Cardinal Neural Observable
The RUM specifies that the difference in utility influences choice likelihood, and therefore posits that utility is a cardinal quantity. To establish that our neural observable is cardinal, we must establish that neural measurements are made on some scale in which the difference between measurements is related to the likelihood that a subject will switch their choice behavior in repeated choice sets and that this difference predicts choices beyond a simple ordering.
In the experiment, measurements of BOLD activity from the mPFC and the striatum were taken on 11 scanning trials independently for each good over the course of an hour. The measurements precededand were independent of-the two choice trials of interest. We use the time index m to denote these measurement trials and use the general notation B i,m to denote a measurement from one of these regions (we will report results for each brain area separately).
We assume a linear form for the relationship between the BOLD measurement B i,m from a brain region and subjective value v i,m .
The error term i,m ϳ N(0, 2 ) reflects the error present in measuring neural activity in a magnetic resonance imaging scanner; therefore, a neural measure of subjective value B i,m has two sources of variance: the fluctuation in subjective value on our measurement trials, and measurement error. To arrive at a measure for predicting choice between items i and j on an independent trial t, we average over our 11 measurements.
and then take the difference,
Initially, we proceed under the assumption that there is no sampling and measurement error, ⌬B ij ϭ ␥E͓⌬v ij,t ͔. Although this assumption is clearly not valid, it does lead to some useful intuition for the full model presented in the section "Accounting for Measurement Error." Specifically, assuming an error-free measure of the mean of subjective value allows us to use specification (13). Substituting in equation (17) yields a probability of choosing i,
Under this specification, the NRUM makes three predictions about the likelihood that our subject will choose item i. First, if behavior was only determined by the ordinal comparison v i,t Ͼ v j,t on a given choice trial, then the average measurement of each good over repeated independent measurement trials should contain no predictive information. By contrast, the NRUM predicts that as ⌬B ij increases, the subject should be more likely to choose item i on any given choice trial (Figure 2A) .
Second, recall that subjects made choices over each item-pair twice. Therefore, the likelihood that a subject switches their choice upon repeated trials should decrease with the absolute value of ⌬B ij . Third, if we segregate our item-pairs into those pairs in which the subject chose item i twice, once, or never at all as a function of ⌬B ij , the NRUM would predict P(twice) Ͼ P(once) Ͼ P(never) for a positive difference in measured subjective value. This prediction is depicted in the right panel of Figure 2A , in which choices were simulated according to the NRUM, then the numbers of twice, once, and never observations were fit using an ordered probit model. Table 1 presents the estimates from bringing equation (18) to our data set with the normalization ⌬ϩ⌬ ϭ 1. This standard identification assumption means we are estimating only the relative relationship between neural activity and the choice probabilities. We also included a specification with a constant term c predicted to be zero by the model ⌽ͩc ϩ ␥ Ϫ1 ⌬ϩ⌬ ⌬B ijͪ . For both the mPFC and the striatum, the estimate for ␥ Ϫ1 is positive; therefore, the relationship between the difference in neural measurement (⌬B ij ) and the probability of choosing an item is indeed monotonic (see Figure 2B for the mPFC). As might be expected, no such relationship is found in the OCC control region (see Table 1 ).
To test the second prediction, we repeat the analysis conducted by Agranov and Ortoleva (2017) on their lottery choice data set. An indicator variable codes item-pairs in which subjects switched their choice on repeated trials. Table 2 presents the results of a random-effects generalized least squares regression of this indicator variable on |⌬B ij |. A clear negative relationship between the magnitude of the difference in BOLD activity and the likelihood of the subject switching their choice is observed in this sample. This lies in contrast to the results from Agranov and Ortoleva (2017) , which found no relationship between a behaviorally established measurement of subjective value and choice stochasticity. However, the third prediction of the NRUM does not fare as well, at least at first glance. The fit of the ordered probit model to the number of observed choices has a clear misordering; subjects are more likely to choose an item twice, than never, than once for positive ⌬B ij . We observe too few once choices when ⌬B ij is small, too many when it is large, and far too many never choices when ⌬B ij is large and positive (similarly for twice when it is large and negative). This apparent contradiction of the NRUM arises because we (like much of the neuroscience literature working with choice data) have so far assumed no error in both our BOLD measurement and the construction of our neural measure ⌬B ij . The following section addresses this issue.
Accounting for Measurement Error
We can identify at least three source of measurement error in our data set. First, because we are not measuring subjective value during a choice trial, the realizations of v i,m we do measure are not the ones related to choice on trial t. This component of our measurement error is the sampling error present in v i and is denoted by i in equation (8) . Second, we should also allow for error in the conservative procedure for identifying and constructing a single neural timeseries from the 250,000 we measured. The degree to which the mean activity level of our measure captures the neural encoding of subjective value for consumer items depends on our ex-ante restriction to the mPFC and the striatum and the accuracy with which our first procedure identifies the relevant voxels. This source of variability is captured in i,m . A third source of noise doubtlessly results from the technical limitations imposed by measuring neural activation with an fMRI scanner (Logothetis, 2002) , which is also captured in i,m .
The effect of measurement error in nonlinear models (such as the probit) is larger than in the linear model but generally follows the same intuition: the data are overdispersed along the dimension of the independent variable and the slope parameter is biased toward zero (Yatchew & Griliches, 1985) . Formally, we can no longer work directly from specification (13) because P ij,t ͑⌬B ij ͒ is no longer equivalent to P ij,t ͑E͓⌬v ij,t ͔͒. This means Figure 2 . Analysis of (A) a simulated neural random utility model (NRUM), (B) the medial prefrontal cortex activity from the experimental data set, and (C) a simulated NRUM with measurement error (w/ Meas. Err.). Left panes: The fit of the probit model from (18), assuming no measurement error (i.e., ⌬B i ϭ ␥E͓⌬v ij,t ͔). Right panes: The fit of an ordered probit model for the probability of observing the ith item in an ij pair chosen twice, once, and never. The NRUM was simulated with ␥ Ϫ1 ϭ 10, ⌬ϩ⌬ ϭ 1, and e ϭ 0 or e ϭ 5 (A or C, respectively). See the online article for the color version of this figure. our estimate of ␥ Ϫ1 in the section "A Cardinal Neural Observable" is biased toward zero, and the severity of this bias increases in the degree of measurement error. As our hypothesis predicts a positive value for ␥ Ϫ1 , inference performed on this biased estimate is too conservative, and pursuing a less-biased estimate will yield improved inference and choice prediction.
Recalling equation (16), measurement error enters our specification as an independent itemspecific error term. 21 If we proceed with a specification derived from substituting in our measured neural activation into the sample analog (14), the conditional probability of choosing i is
with the sources of measurement error grouped together in the variable e ij ϵ ␥ Ϫ1 ⌬ ij ϩ ⌬ ij .
The fact that subjects chose between each item-pair twice means that e ij is constant over both choice trials. This means we have two independent choices for each realization of the measurement error. Or said another way, the e ij are (perfectly) correlated over repeated choice trials. We can use this correlation pattern to achieve more efficient (and less biased) estimates of ␥ Ϫ1 -as well as an estimate of the standard deviation of the measurement errorprovided we specify and integrate out a distribution for e ij . We assume e ij ϳ iid N͑0, e 2 ͒; therefore, our specification takes the form of a random-effects probit model, however with two important caveats that differ from standard applications.
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(1) ⌬B ij and e ij are not independent. This means that the random-effects probit estimate of ␥ Ϫ1 will also be biased toward zero, though not as severely as a probit with no random effect. Therefore, we can only partially correct for the bias introduced by measurement error.
(2) The e ij are not independent over choice pairs. As the neural measurement takes place at the level of the individual item, when differencing the measurement for an item-pair, there is correlation in the random effect e ij between item-pairs that share an item. For instance, e 12 and e 13 are correlated because they share the measurement of Item 1. This means a random-effects estimate is inefficient, and standard errors will be biased toward zero if not controlled for. In addition, the estimate of e will be biased positively (Wang, Lin, Gutierrez, & Carroll, 1998) .
To account for these issues, we pursue a hybrid approach in which we estimate the randomeffects model clustered at the level of the itempair (to capitalize on the common measurement error over choice trials within an item-pair, partially reducing the bias and achieving more efficient estimates), and then correct our standard errors for inference using a multiway clustering approach (to account for the nonindependence of the differenced measurement errors). The item-pair level likelihood is then given by
where
We also include a specification with a constant term (predicted to be zero). Including a correction for measurement error substantially increases the fit of the NRUM (see Table 1 ), with the log-likelihood(s) improving by nearly a factor of 1 3 . The estimated coefficients for ␥ Ϫ1 are also substantially higher than our baseline specification, increasing by roughly a factor of 5 in both the mPFC and the striatum. This indicates that the relationship between neural activity and choice probability is severely biased when measurement error is unaccounted for. Figure 3 depicts the fitted probability of choosing item i as a function of the difference in neural activity (generated under the assumption that the random-effect e ij ϭ 0). Accounting for measurement error yields a significant increase in the magnitude of the relationship between neural activity and choice probability compared with our earlier analysis in the section "A Cardinal Neural Observable." Moreover, the difference in neural activity yields improved model fit compared with a simple ordinal ranking of the BOLD activity, again establishing the cardinality of our neural measure. 22 A random-effects model is robust to the distributional assumption for the random effect (here, measurement error) provided it is not highly asymmetric (Neuhaus, McCulloch, & Boylan, 2011 Note. The random-effect and clustered standard errors are implemented at the subject level. GLS ϭ generalized least squares; BOLD ϭ blood-oxygenation-level-dependent; mPFC ϭ medial prefrontal cortex; OCC ϭ occipital cortex.
In both the mPFC and the striatum, the standard deviation of the measurement error e is estimated to be ϳ4.7 times ⌬ϩ⌬ . Therefore in both specifications, over 95% of the variance in the model is attributed to measurement error. To verify that measurement error is generating the results observed in the section "A Cardinal Neural Observable," we introduced measurement error into the simulated data reported in Figure  2A and repeated the original analysis. These simulated results now match our empirical findings ( Figure 2C ). Because measurement error has the effect of "smearing" the observed once choices over the range of observed ⌬B ij , a choice pair in which the distributions of subjective value are close together (small E͓⌬v ij,t ͔)-likely resulting in a once outcomecould yield a large ⌬B ij because of measurement error. This occurs because the degree of measurement error has no effect on the number of once choices observed, only on where they appear on the ⌬B ij axis. Although this degree of measurement error is striking, and verified by simulation ( Figure 2C ), we should note again that this estimate is based on a misspecification of the random effect.
Subject-Specific Analysis
In principle, a subject-specific analysis is useful to consider. Commensurate with existing data and previous fMRI studies (Logothetis, 2003) , it is likely that different subjects have a steeper mapping between the BOLD measurement and neural activity than do others. The bulk of this difference is typically held to reflect a technical feature of the interaction between Figure 3 . The probability of choosing an item depends on the difference in medial prefrontal cortex activity between items. The fitted probabilities are generated using a standard probit estimate for ␥ Ϫ1 , an estimate for ␥ Ϫ1 corrected for measurement error (assuming the random effect is zero), and a standard probit estimate of choice on the ordinal difference in the blood-oxygenation-level-dependent (BOLD) ranking. The shaded areas depict the fitted probabilities derived from the 95% confidence intervals of the estimates. See the online article for the color version of this figure. the scanner and the subject: the subject-specific coefficient describing the coupling of neural activity to the blood flow rate measured by fMRI. We can capture such heterogeneity by allowing equation (16) 
The parameter ␥ s is therefore a subject-specific relationship between the neural measurement and the subjective value. We can estimate ␥ s Ϫ1 through a subject-⌬B ij interaction term using specification (19) on the full sample, however with only 380 observations per subject.
Breaking up the sample into so few observations per subject reveals the limits of discrete choice estimation methods in small samples. For the mPFC, six of the subjects yield positive and significant estimates of ␥ s Ϫ1 , whereas six are not significantly different from zero (see Table 3 ). Although under the null hypothesis we should only expect one significant subject, rather than six, this is still a substantial degree of variance in the model. 23 Results from the striatum display a similar pattern, though with a somewhat larger amount of variation. Nine of 11 estimates are positive, though only two significantly so at the .10 level. In both the mPFC and the striatum, the Akaike Information Criterion is higher than for the pooled estimates, even after correcting for measurement error. We also found no significant relationship between the size of the regions of interest for each subject and the variance of ␥ s Ϫ1 (Table 5 ). This suggests that a subject-specific estimate of the relationship between neural activity and choice is limited in small samples and that pooling data to estimate this relationship yields improved fit (provided preferences are allowed to vary across subjects).
Application: In-Sample Choice Prediction
The NRUM yields an estimated relationship between neural activity (or other observables) and choice behavior. In the analysis that follows, we compare the performance of three models:
• NRUM: subject-specific estimates (see Table 1);
• NRUM with measurement error correction: subject-specific estimates corrected for measurement error (see Table 3 ); and • NRUM ϩ observables: corrected subjectspecific estimates with additional economic observables included as regressors: the price of the item (a market-based method) and its "Amazon star" rating (a statedpreference method).
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The estimates from each of these models yields a fitted choice probability for each choice pair P ij , and these probabilities can be combined with a prediction rule to assess the model's true predictive performance for any set of neurobiological observables. Numerous methods have been proposed to evaluate the performance of discrete choice models and the literature. For instance, to determine whether a cardinal prediction rule captures stochastic choice behavior, some method for pooling over discrete choices is required (after all, we wish to compare a probability with a binary outcome). The simplest way to achieve this is to average over repeated choices from the same choice set.
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For this reason, we will examine the results from different choice prediction rules when repeated choice trials are treated both independently and jointly. For exposition, we will focus on in-sample prediction rates for measurements from the mPFC. 23 Monte Carlo simulations verify the loss in efficiency due to reducing observations. Simulated choice and neural data with ␥ s Ϫ1 ϭ 10 and measurement error from the section "Accounting for Measurement Error" lead to ϳ5% of the ␥ s Ϫ1 estimates less than, but not significantly different from, zero (from a total of 1,000 simulations). 24 The "Amazon star" rating is the aggregation of user ratings that can be found on the item's description on amazon. com. Both of these measurements have the drawback of being population-level variables that represent (to some degree) the aggregation of preference across all consumers, limiting their ability to predict individual choices. However, both of them were significant predictors. The Amazon rating varied positively with the choices of our subjects, suggesting some homogeneity in the preferences of New York University undergrads, whereas prices varied negatively with choice. One might expect subjects to be choosing high-priced goods (which they receive at no monetary cost in the experiment), but likely reflects the popularity of the CDs in our choice set, a relatively inexpensive item. 25 For another method that pools "locally" over nearby choice sets with similar predicted probabilities, see Smith et al. (2014) .
Treating Each Choice Trial Independently
We first examine in-sample predictive performance in which each trial is treated independently, regardless of whether it comes from the same choice set, and consider the following prediction rules:
• Bayes classifier: This is the prediction rule typically reported in statistical software. The fitted probabilities P ij codes a predicted choice ŷ ij,t ϭ 1 if P ij Ͼ 0.5 ∀t, ŷ ij,t ϭ 0 otherwise. The prediction is then compared with the observed choice y ij,t and the rate of successful predictions reported. The Bayes classifier essentially nullifies the cardinality of the analysis and magnifies the sign difference of the neural observable (i.e., ␥ Ϫ1 ⌬B ij Ͼ 0 ) P ij Ͼ 0.5) yielding a deterministic prediction (i.e., all trials from the same choice pair will have the same prediction).
• Bernoulli prediction rate: The predicted probability of the observed outcome for choice pair ij on trial t is y ij,t P ij ϩ ͑1 Ϫ y ij,t ͒͑1 Ϫ P ij ͒. Averaging this predicted probability over all ij and t gives the proportion of successful predictions if each trial is treated as an independent draw from a Bernoulli distribution with probability P ij . • Cramer's : Let Ϫ P ϩ and Ϫ P Ϫ denote the average predicted probability on trials in which y ij,t ϭ 1 and y ij,t ϭ 0, respectively. Then, ϵ Ϫ P ϩ Ϫ Ϫ P Ϫ ʦ ͓0,1͔ reflects the ability of the model to discriminate between outcomes Note. NRUM ϭ neural random utility model; LL ϭ Log Likelihood; AIC ϭ Akaike Information Criterion.
and measures the proportion of total variation in y that is "explained" (Cramer, 1999) . A ϭ 0 represents the null model predicting at chance, whereas ϭ 1 represents perfect discrimination.
Results from the prediction rules are presented in Figure 4 . The improvement granted by the correction for measurement error can be seen in the results for Cramer's . The correction improves the discriminability of the NRUM to 0.16, an improvement of 0.10. Compared with the prediction rate of 55.7% in the work by , in-sample prediction rates increase to 57.9% using the NRUM estimates corrected for measurement error. The naive prediction rate for the NRUM estimates is 60.3%, with the improvement over the analysis coming from the three subjects with negative estimates of ␥
Ϫ1
. 26 This marginal improvement in prediction rates highlights the limitations of assessing a cardinal model when each choice is treated independently. 27 Moreover, note that these prediction rates are still lower than those derived from a model that only includes the price and quality observables (64.5% and 65.4%, depending on the prediction rule). Combining the neural measurements with these additional variables increases prediction rates further to 69.6% and 71.0% (depending on the prediction rule) and significantly improves the discriminability of the model, suggesting the individually measured neural activity contains information orthogonal to the aggregate observables.
Treating Repeated Choice Trials Jointly
To assess the ability of a cardinal model to capture stochastic choice behavior, we propose two possible methods for comparing predictive performance when repeated choice sets are treated jointly. The first is conditional on the choice outcome, the second is conditional on the choice prediction.
Conditional on choice outcome. Let the vector z ij ʦ {0, 1, 2} represent whether item i was chosen never, once, or twice from a choice pair ij. Let N denote the total number of choice pairs, and ␣ 2 ϭ ͚1 z ij ϭ2 N the proportion of twice observed in the data set, with ␣ 1 , ␣ 0 defined accordingly. The predicted probability of the observed outcome for choice pair ij is given by
Averaging this predicted probability conditional on the outcome then gives a measure of how well the model predicts the sample of observed outcomes. For example,
is the average probability of a correct prediction of a twice outcome. However, this approach ignores the fact that outcomes in the sample occur in different proportions.
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Conditional on choice prediction. Consider a predicted choice ẑ ij ʦ ͕0, 1, 2͖ drawn from the binomial distribution of size 2, with probability of success P ij . A correct prediction of, for example, ẑ ij ϭ 2 would be observed with probability P ij 2 for choice pairs on which a twice outcome occurred, and 0 otherwise. Summing this prediction rate over all choice pairs, and dividing by ͚ij P ij 2 , therefore "weights" predicted probabilities by the proportion in which the outcomes are observed in the data. For intuition, consider taking R draws of ẑ ij . The measure is equivalent to calculating the number of correct predictions in this simulated sample, conditional on the prediction being twice, once, or never.
The distinction between the two prediction rules is important, because for our entire sample, the frequency of never is 46.0%, once is 9.3%, and twice is 44.8%. If each individual choice were predicted at chance, we would predict never on Therefore, the prediction rates arrived at by chance depend on the distribution of never, once, or twice in the data set. In such a null model, P ij ϭ 1 2 , and the predicted probability of a twice 26 In comparison, Smith et al. (2014) reported a 61.3% out-of-sample prediction rate, whereas the rate reported here is in-sample. This improvement in their choice prediction likely arises from a more sophisticated aggregation of the BOLD data than used in this study. 27 All of these results are robust to reserving half of the sample for estimation, then implementing the prediction exercise on the holdout sample.
28 For a similar argument in the case of an independent binary choice trial in which the observed outcomes are not in equal proportion, see Cramer (1999). outcome is P ij 2 ϭ 1 4 . Therefore, the prediction rate conditional on the prediction yields ͚ij 1 z ij ϭ2 P ij ϭ ␣, the proportion of twice outcomes observed in the sample. As the predictive power of the model improves, this measure approaches 1.
However, an ordinal prediction based solely on the ordered BOLD activity, such as in the analysis by , predicts an item will be chosen either twice or never, and cannot account for trials in which an item was chosen only once. As the NRUM uses the cardinal difference in valuations to modulate the choice probabilities, it can be combined with the above prediction rules to predict such behavior.
The results from this exercise are reported in Table 4 . 29 We find that the NRUM predicts 28.6% of such trials observed in the data set, compared with 0% for the ordinal model. Here, again, we see the (often overlooked) effect of measurement error in the observable. Because our measurement error correction increases the discriminability of the predicted probabilities, it predicts fewer once outcomes compared to the uncorrected estimates and the null model. But because the correction only measures the variance of the measurement error, as opposed to its realization on any trial, there are still many once outcomes observed in which the predicted probability P ij is near 0 or 1, decreasing the prediction rate of once outcomes from its upper bound of 50%. This improvement in discriminability, however, does improve the number of twice and once predictions (45.0% vs. 30.8%) and was also more accurate conditional on whether an item was predicted to be chosen never or twice from a pair (56.8% vs. 51.8%, and 56.1% vs. 50.8%). 
Application: Estimating Demand
One proposed advantage of neuroeconomic methods is a richer data source on which to assess the demand for new products (Ariely & Berns, 2010) . Consider a standard demand forecasting exercise for a new product i. A researcher sets out to assess the change in demand for this product from manipulating a characteristic (e.g., quality or price). Assume that this manipulation increases the underlying valuation of this product from v i to v i . The section "Accounting for Measurement Error" details how the presence of significant error in neural measurements will bias the estimates of these marginal effects.
To clarify this point, suppose the researcher has access to neural measurements B i and B i to assess this manipulation. In addition, they make a neural measure for a reference product j, which for the sake of argument we normalize to B j ϭ 0. The true change in demand, as a function of the neural measurements, is thus P i ͑B i ͒ Ϫ P i ͑B i ͒ ( Figure 5 , solid black line). Note that the change in demand depends on the magnitude of the measurement. This relation between the magnitude of the marginal effect and the location of the measurement is a feature of any demand prediction exercise based on a discrete choice model.
For instance, the NRUM provides a predicted choice probability, P i ͑B i ͒, as a function of the neural measure and the estimated marginal effect. Therefore, the predicted change in demand from the manipulation is given by P i ͑B i ͒ Ϫ P i ͑B i ͒ (Figure 5 , dashed line). Even a small increase in neural response to the manipulation, B i , will lead to
However, the relation between the marginal effect and location of the measurement is also why measurement error can impact a demand prediction exercise. In a "naive" model that does not account for measurement error, the predicted probability is constructed via an estimate ␥ Ϫ1 that is biased toward zero. In the absence of a correction for this error, the predicted demand P i ͑B i ͒ is (weakly) smaller than the true demand P i ͑B i ͒. The magnitude of this gap also depends on the difference between the neural measures. For some differences in the neural measurement, the naive analysis will underpredict the change in demand from the product manipulation (B i to B i ). But suppose the researcher further manipulates the product, yielding a larger neural response B i . Now the naive analysis overpredicts the change in demand P i ͑B i ͒ Ϫ P i ͑B i ͒ relative to the true change P i ͑B i ͒ Ϫ P i ͑B i ͒. As the correction for measurement error offered by the NRUM reduces the gap between the true and predicted probabilities, it yields a predicted change in demand that is closer to the true demand. Our experimental data set provides an opportunity to quantify the degree of this bias. The sample of choice objects contained five 50/50 lottery tickets over different dollar amounts ($10, $15, $20, $25 , and $30 if win, and $0 if lose), so we can analyze the change in demand as the amount of the winning outcome is increased, relative to the reference $10 lottery. Because the lottery amounts are monotonically increasing, subjects with completely transitive preferences should always choose the higher lottery (relative to the $10 reference lottery). Indeed, this is what we find in our data. Figure  5 also reports the predicted probabilities from the NRUM with and without the measurement error correction, taken at the average BOLD measurement for each lottery (across measurement trials and subjects). As expected, the degree of bias due to measurement error is large. For the baseline probit model, the predicted change in demand for the larger lotteries is minimal (2% in mPFC and 5% in striatum), considerably understating the change in demand for the larger lotteries. By contrast, the NRUM with measurement error correction is larger (roughly 10% in mPFC and 20% in Striatum).
This example illustrates a fundamental issue with predicting discrete choice outcomes in the presence of measurement error. Given the degree of measurement error we find in our neural measurement, it is paramount that prediction exercises account for this bias in the estimated relationship between neural activity and choice behavior. At the very least, the bias correction proposed in the section "Accounting for Measurement Error" should be considered in future prediction exercises.
Normative Implications: Distribution of Subjective Value
The general formulation of an RUM places no a priori restriction on the distribution of utilities (Becker et al., 1963) . In this version of the NRUM, we have attempted to formulate subjective value as generally as possible so that it might encompass the two predominant views about stochastic choice in the economics literature.
The NRUM is general enough to allow for a random preference interpretation because no re- striction is placed on the distribution of v t , particularly its within-item covariances. Therefore, the stochastic valuations of each alternative can be correlated in accordance with the requirements of a particular random preference formulation. Of course, it is also possible to impose independence directly on v t , yielding a model in which the stochastic valuation of each alternative is processed independently. Because the NRUM renders the covariance matrix of v t empirically observable, it is possible to differentiate between these views with an appropriate data set. In this study, as the subjective values of items were measured independently, in isolation, and on different trials, we can safely assume that v i,m and v j,n are independent over different measurement trials m and n.
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Even after allowing for a random preference specification for subjective value, however, the NRUM still incorporates a Fechnerian stochastic element, modeled via the additive random vector t . This error term arises from stochasticity in the choice process downstream from valuation regions. The distinction between these two neural sources of stochasticity has critical normative implications. If ⌬ ϭ 0, then all choice stochasticity is due to variation in subjective value, and choice can be defined as optimal (in the traditional economic sense) because choosers then act to maximize their realized, albeit stochastic, subjective values. However, if ⌬ Ͼ 0, then some choices can be classified as errors arising in the neural implementation of the maximization operation and the execution of the choice behavior. Thus, the relative sizes of ⌬ and ⌬ reflect the degree to which stochasticity in choice can be strictly Figure 6 . Region-of-interest localizations for Subjects 1, 2, and 3. Activity from these regions were used to define B s,i,m . See the online article for the color version of this figure. viewed as welfare decreasing in a given neural data set. Evidence from perceptual neuroscience (in which there is an objectively "correct" answer) identifies that most of the variance in choice stochasticity can be attributed to brain areas encoding stimulus value, suggesting less than 10% of choice stochasticity can be attributed to downstream neural circuitry that implements the choice (Drugowitsch, Wyart, Devauchelle, & Koechlin, 2016; Michelson, Pillow, & Seidemann, 2017) .
We should note that in all likelihood, v and are the product of realizations at multiple points in the human nervous system. Although we are unable to fully differentiate between these two sources of variance in this specific study because we do not make independent measurements at multiple stages along the pathways that represent subjective value, we observe stochastic choice behavior that has features of an additive random utility specification: a larger difference in subjective value makes an item more likely to be chosen. Our own conviction, which stems from an amalgamation of the economic and neurobiological literature, is that a model which incorporates both classes of stochasticity will most closely approximate the structure of human choice behavior. We note that anchoring our model to this conviction effectively posits a distinction between the fraction of choice stochasticity that can be attributed to stochasticity in preference and the fraction that can be attributed to errors induced by the choice mechanism. This distinction has clear welfare implications that would necessarily be of interest as more is learned about these sources of stochasticity in choice behavior (Bernheim, 2009) .
Conclusion
In this article, we have proposed a cardinal econometric framework, the NRUM, for relating neural observables to stochastic choice behavior. The NRUM specifies the sources of stochasticity present in a measurement of neural activity, incorporating both the random preference and the Fechnerian approach to modeling stochastic choice behavior, and examines how these sources interact within an experimental paradigm for the purposes of choice prediction.
A concrete example of subjects choosing over consumer items was developed in detail. We find that neural activity, measured in isolation, predicts subsequent choice behavior as has been previously argued. However, we also find that the magnitude of the difference in neural activity is positively correlated with the degree of stochasticity in choice (measured via the number of preference switches in repeated trials). These results establish that neural measurements carry cardinal information relevant for choice prediction.
However, we also find that measurement error limits the effectiveness of the neural observables far more than has been acknowledged in the literature. Econometric techniques available to the NRUM framework mitigate some of the impact of measurement error-yielding less-biased model estimates-provided that the experiment consists of repeated choice trials from the same choice sets. To assess the predictive performance of these measurements, we examined previously proposed prediction rules for choice trials treated independently, and propose new prediction rules appropriate for repeated choice trials from the same choice set. When choice trials are treated independently, the NRUM yields marginal improvements in choice prediction, primarily owing to the correction for measurement error. However, when repeated choice trials are treated jointly, the cardinality of the NRUM allows the model to better capture the distribution of choice outcomes compared with an ordinal model.
The measurement error correction we explore in this article uses a convenient property of the data set, namely that each choice was repeated twice. This allows measurement error to be modeled as a random effect that holds constant over repeated choices. Apart from the improvement in model estimates, this approach has the added benefit of providing identification of the standard deviation of the measurement error. However, there are limitations to this method. Because the measurement error is correlated over trials, the random effect is misspecified and the measurement error estimate will be biased positively. For this reason, the estimate e provided here should be considered an upper bound, though we do confirm via simulation that a considerable degree of measurement error is needed to match features of the observed data. In principle, unbiased estimates should be feasible provided that the correct structure of the random effect is specified. This would require devising an estimator that relaxes the independence assumption used here.
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Even after the measurement error correction, choice prediction performance barely matches two standard aggregate observables, the price and quality ratings of the items. Combining neural measurements and standard observables further improves choice prediction, suggesting that the neural observables provide subject-specific information. Of course, this improvement comes at a high implementation cost for brain-scanning technology (roughly $50,000 for Levy and colleagues to produce this data set), limiting the prevalence and usefulness of current neural measurements.
Our approach to modeling choice prediction from neural observables thus offers four contributions to the literature. It establishes that neural measurements do carry cardinal information about the relative values of alternatives. It establishes the positive performance of neural measurements using fMRI technology and defines clearly the benchmarking process that will be required for future measurement techniques. It offers a general framework for combined economic-neurobiological modeling from which both richer, more restrictive specifications can be developed. And finally, it lays out the basic welfare structure inherent in a neurobiological decision model. 31 In addition, simulation-based techniques for an unbiased estimate exist in the biostatistics literature (Carroll et al., 2006, Chapter 5) . Our simulation results (Figure 2 ) suggest e is too large by roughly a factor of 2 for them to be applicable but may soon become practical as technology improves.
